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This paper examines two soft robots from technical research and media art respectively and the 
practices through which they come into being. Departing from a juxtaposition of video presentations 
of the two robots, the empirical ontologies of a soft robot enacted in practice are analysed. The paper 
argues that two different versions of softness are being done and that the two sets of practices 
concomitantly respecify “knowledge” and “autonomy” as concepts, with different ethical and 
political implications.  
Soft robotics. Soft material robots. Media art. Robotic art. Empirical ontology.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the course of the past ten years, soft robotics has 
become a thriving subfield of technical robotics 
research. Despite an observable tendency towards 
convergence, a number of different definitions of soft 
robotics and what a soft robot is still exist within the 
technical literature. Wang and colleagues (2017), for 
instance, remark that soft robotics “encompasses 
solutions that interact with [the] environment relying 
on inherent or structural compliance”. Whereas Rus 
and Tolley (2015) define soft robots as “systems that 
are capable of autonomous behavio[u]r, and that are 
primarily composed of materials with [elastic] moduli 
in the range of that of soft biological materials”.  
 
Constructing robots from soft and elastic materials 
yields a number of technical benefits that include 
safe interaction through passive compliance, the 
possibility for shape-shifting and bodily adaptation, 
ease of control through morphological computation, 
and the potential to reuse stored elastic energy. But 
soft robots are equally endowed with a specific 
expressivity and a different aesthetic than their rigid 
precursors. These latter aspects have recently 
begun to be explored in a number of appropriations 
of soft robotics technology by artists, designers and 
architects. Examples of soft robots featured in 
artworks that were produced prior to soft robotics’ 
emergence as a field, however, also exist. 
 
This paper seeks to unpack the notion of a soft robot 
through an ontological mode of analysis inspired by 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Departing from the 
assumption that ontology, understood not as “that 
which is” but as “how things exist”, is entwined with 
ethics and politics, the paper explores the practices 
of designing, constructing, interacting with and 
thinking about soft robots within two projects of 
technical robotics research and media art 
respectively. How are soft robots “being done” and 
by which means are different versions of soft 
materiality enacted? What tendencies and 
capacities of soft matter do these different soft 
robots actualise? In what sense is softness rendered 
active or agential?  
1.1 Approach 
As mentioned, the approach taken is inspired by 
ANT and the so-called ontological turn within 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). It is 
grounded in the argument put forth here that reality, 
as we inhabit it, is performed within different 
practices. Reality itself is thus multiple, not in a 
social constructivist sense, but in a deeper 
ontological sense (Mol 1999). And an object, such 
as a soft robot, can come in various versions, that 
despite sharing physical similarities, or even being 
physically identical, might diverge ontologically. In 
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their studies of Atlantic salmon, John Law and 
Marianne Lien (2012) put this in relational terms as 
“different salmon are done in different practices” and 
“different salmon are being enacted”. And 
Annemarie Mol (2014) has similarly articulated this 
notion in her argument that each version of 
practicing stages, performs, does, and enacts a 
different version of “the” object, which must therefore 
be considered “an object multiple” (Mol 2014). 
Within the ANT tradition this assumption of 
ontological multiplicity is operationalised in 
interpretive strategies that foreground and study 
practical ontologies empirically by paying close 
attention to the practices and networks of relations 
through which a specific version of an object is 
brought forth.  
 
In the case of soft robotics as an emerging 
technology, the indeterminacy and multiplicity of the 
object in question, is perhaps even more readily 
apparent, as the technical object, a soft robot, is 
currently still being invented and articulated. But 
what a soft robot is and does, is also already 
gradually becoming more specified and stabilised 
through the contingent processes, actions, and 
discourses that make up practices. At this juncture, 
it is therefore relevant to consider how different 
enactments of “a soft robot” diverge, and that, given 
the choice between these different versions, to 
reflect on what politics and ethics that are enacted in 
conjunction with their differences.  
 
The main interest of this paper is therefore to explore 
how soft robots get put together within two different 
contexts and associated sets of practices. 
Consequently, its focus lies on analysing the 
practices and the soft robot ontologies they enact – 
how specific versions of “a soft robot” emerge and 
how these might differ. Furthermore, the paper 
seeks to engage with the merits and drawbacks of 
these two different ways of assembling “a soft robot”. 
It aims to extend the specific risks and potentials 
“that singulari[s]e each position”, to use a 
formulation of Isabelle Stengers (2005a). 
1.2 Analysis of video / analysis of practices 
A few further methodological remarks are needed 
before continuing, about how this paper extends the 
analytical practices of ANT and STS. Unlike most 
work anchored in the STS tradition, this paper is not 
based on ethnographic fieldwork. Instead it utilises 
two videos as its most immediate empirical 
materials. Even if ANT as a theoretical formation is 
critical towards the notion that there is ever such a 
thing as an unmediated access to the field, or reality 
as such, the kind of access to practices provided by 
a video obviously differs from the one obtained by 
being present at a physical site and associating with 
informants. Moreover, a framing evidently occurs 
when practices are translated into the video 
medium. Consequently, when analysing video, one 
obviously runs the risk of mistaking an edited 
representation for “the thing itself”. In my analyses, I 
aim to stay aware of the limited and mediated 
access to practices the two videos offer. Both videos 
are clearly censored and staged accounts 
influenced by specific agendas and aspirations as 
well as the affordances of video as a medium. But 
analysing the practices as they are depicted in these 
videos rather than doing field ethnography, I argue, 
holds a different potential. Precisely because the 
videos are self-representations emerging from the 
practices they depict, what is included or excluded 
betrays assumptions about what is important and 
unimportant within these practices. Comparative 
analysis can thus function as a means to become 
aware of the blind spots of each video and 
potentially reconstruct some of what is left out in 
each of them. A further resource, that forms a 
backdrop for this work, yet remains a tacit voice in 
the text, is my own involvement with soft robotics, 
that have unfolded as both academic research and 
artistic practice, over the course of the past two 
years. 
 
Embracing the situatedness of my own account, I 
have chosen to let the paper reflect its process of 
coming into being by starting the analysis with 
excerpts from notes that I originally jotted down 
while watching the videos on my computer as a 
prerequisite for writing this paper. Unless otherwise 
specified, quotations come from these notes. 
2. TWO VIDEOS 
An upbeat yet restrained music played on 
acoustic instruments is heard (it is similar to the 
kind of music that is featured in commercials for 
products). The first images we see is of the semi-
transparent Octobot with its characteristic blue 
and red fuel chambers and channels. It is seen 
from above on a white background. The title of 
the video then emerges in the white space next to 
the robot along with the Harvard seal … 
 
Figure 1: Still image from the opening shot of the first 
video. Courtesy of Harvard SEAS. 
The first video (Harvard University 2016) 
disseminates research from an academic paper 
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published as a letter in Nature, one of the most 
prestigious high impact science journals. The paper 
is authored by seven researchers from Harvard 
University and Weill Cornell Medicine. The video 
was produced by Leah Burrows, a Science and 
Technology Communications Officer at Harvard 
University. It was released on YouTube on 24 
August 2016, the same day as the paper was 
published. The video is 1 minute and 34 seconds 
long and entitled “Introducing the Octobot”. 
The opening shot shows a woman sitting with a 
piece of paper reading aloud from it. Besides the 
voice only static noise and room noises can be 
heard. There is no professional lighting to 
improve the quality of the video images. The 
woman reads […] in Spanish. There are English 
subtitles displayed at the bottom of the video. She 
informs us that she has designed “an 
autonomous robotic agent, whose most relevant 
behaviour is its capacity of having a body 
‘language’”. 
Figure 2: Still image from the beginning of the second 
video. Courtesy of Paula Gaetano Adi. 
The second video (Gaetano Adi 2006) is stored on 
the Vimeo platform and embedded on the webpage 
of media artist Paula Gaetano Adi. It documents her 
robotic artwork Alexitimia (2006/2007). It was 
produced by the artist in 2006 and is 9 minutes and 
43 seconds long1.  
2.1 Fabrication 
What defines a soft robot and through which 
methods and procedures might we know about and 
construct soft robots? Proceeding from an interest in 
empirical ontology, these are some of the questions 
we can ask of practices. For both videos, the 
answers given seem to hinge on revealing and 
making visible an origin and function but also on 
something more. Both videos share a similar 
symmetrical narrative structure: first there is footage 
of the robot, then its fabrication and functioning are 
explained and lastly the finished robot is shown 
again. 
 
Consider the midsection of the Octobot video: 
We see footage of the manufacturing of the robot, 
which occurs on a multimaterial embed 3D printer 
that uses a syringe to pierce through the uncured 
liquid silicone in a mould. Materials with the right 
mechanical properties are deposited into [what]… 
will later become the body of the robot. The [rigid] 
robot constructing the soft robot moves fast and 
precisely … The uncured silicone lights up in a 
bright fluorescent bluish hue, and the printed 
inner channels appear in red. … The [soft] robot 
is then seen from above, as in the beginning, and 
we are told that it is controlled with a microfluid[ic] 
logic circuit … “The logic circuit acts just like a 
circuit board, autonomously directing fuel” 
 
Figure 3: Still image from the video showing the 
Octobot’s fabrication. Courtesy of Harvard SEAS. 
Compare this with how the fabrication is depicted in 
Gaetano Adi’s video: 
4:40: A spherical shape is shown occupying most 
of the frame. She gradually adds pieces of clay to 
cover its surface, making sure to even them out 
using both of her hands … A gloved hand is 
distributing a white layer of liquid material (latex) 
across the surface. Footage where hoses are 
seen being attached. This occurs with the use of 
a brush that gently adds latex on top of a white 
fabric mesh that looks like gauze … Flexible piezo 
film sensors are added, painted over with latex 
meticulously (… [she] handles and controls the 
brush skilfully) to sense the touch.  6:23: Using 
what looks like a soldering iron she very carefully 
punches holes [in the tubing], wearing glasses to 
better see … The gestures and setup look like an 
operation being performed on a human body that 
is partially covered, but the tool that is used is 
usually used to repair or assemble electronics. It 
is at once a technical operation (repairing a 
machine) and a surgery…  
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Figure 4: Still image from the video: Holes are 
made. Courtesy of Paula Gaetano Adi. 
6.47: The semi-sphere is seen lying on a plinth(?) 
it is lifted over to reveal wires, which the woman 
is seen twisting together (the sensors were 
“connected in parallel…”). The microcontroller is 
placed in a small plastic suitcase-like enclosure 
that looks to be fixed atop a baking tin. It activates 
four pumps, hidden inside [the] pedestal in [a] 
reservoir with distilled water. 
Juxtaposing the two different versions of soft robot 
fabrication in the two videos, it becomes clear that 
soft robots are enmeshed in dissimilar practices 
characterised by markedly different procedures and 
aspirations. In the Octobot video, there are no 
humans present. We are in a sort of ideal 
decontextualised flat space of modern science, 
devoid of subjects and subjectivities. The only actors 
present are precise machines that manipulate and 
combine materials with full reproducibility. In great 
contrast to this, Alexitimia is always depicted in the 
presence of its human creator, the artist, whose 
physical labour is portrayed as bringing it into 
existence through careful and caring attention. 
2.2 Production as knowledge  
How to make sense of these differences? Scale 
obviously has a bearing on some of them – the 
Octobot is driven by chemical reactions and 
microfluidic circuits whereas Alexitimia has a size 
comparable to that of the human body and is 
powered by a traditional microcontroller, electrical 
sensors and water pumps that can be assembled by 
hand. The two videos thus attest to what soft 
elastomers are capable of becoming when entering 
into composition with computing technologies on 
different scales. But the actions and practices 
depicted also reverberate with ideals from their 
respective cultural domains – the artwork as a 
materialization of the artist’s embodied mastery of 
her physical medium and the scientific object as 
founded on pure objectivity, unsoiled by human 
desire. The two fabrication processes can, 
moreover, be seen to echo different historical modes 
of technical practice – automated industrial mass 
production in the case of the Octobot and traditional 
crafts in the case of Alexitimia. This observation that 
the Octobot fabrication takes mass production as its 
ideal might also lead one to take note of the word 
“Veritas” that is included in the diagram of the 
Octobot’s microfluidic logic circuit in the video 
(Figure 6) and printed on the physical circuit, just as 
a brand name often is on mass produced 
commodities.  
 
 
Figure 5: Still image from the video: Diagram of the logic 
circuit. Courtesy of Harvard SEAS. 
“Veritas”, truth, is the motto of Harvard, its brand. As 
a sign, “Veritas” branded on the robot performs 
several functions. On the one hand, it is an 
authoritative sign of truth, that is – a symbol referring 
to Harvard and the Ivy League system and its 
institutionalised politics of knowledge. But it also 
denotes the robot as a physical instance of the truth, 
a research insight. But how exactly does a thing 
become truth? And if this thing is the truth, then has 
this truth been produced, and not discovered? And 
how exactly did that occur? 
 
If one looks elsewhere than the video, it becomes 
clear that this process was indeed a production, and 
one of a considerable volume. More specifically, 300 
not-quite Octobots were produced before arriving at 
a functional Octobot (Sklar 2016). That this iterative 
material process was needed to produce the truth of 
the Octobot, points to that soft materials are hard to 
simulate accurately in a computer. While roboticists 
routinely simulate rigid morphologies to determine 
their most optimal designs, this is not easily done 
with complex soft morphologies with existing 
techniques such as the finite element method 
(FEM). In this respect, the dynamics of soft materials 
can be said to resist or escape numerical 
representation and computation as a force of 
knowledge production. This unknowability of the 
physicality of soft materials exemplifies what 
Andrew Pickering (1994) has termed the 
“resistance” of matter: When we probe and prod it, 
that is, when we push, it also pushes back in its own 
specific, and sometimes unpredictable, ways (see 
also Hayles 2014 on this). The right design 
parameters of a functioning Octobot could not be 
predicted beforehand by combining existing models 
from soft matter physics and chemistry. It had to 
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emerge from complex dynamics and adjustments 
that were negotiated through material practice. 
2.3 Unknowing softness 
The way Gaetano Adi stages and addresses her 
robot also points to something that is unknowable in 
the abstract. But here the notion that some insights 
about soft robots and soft materiality can only be 
experimented, or intuited, is embraced as an explicit 
and integral part of practice and the resulting 
artwork, and not merely seen as an obstacle to 
overcome. Overall, Alexitimia is concerned with 
trying to find a “body language of robots”, Gaetano 
Adi tells us in the video, and with establishing “a 
dialog between two kinds of bodies: a corporal 
dialog” (Gaetano Adi 2006): 
the interface of the work is the skin, the sense of 
touch is what enables the interaction, and 
between them [the human and the robot] it is the 
sweating of the robot’s body [t]hat creates the 
dialog. (Gaetano Adi 2006) 
Despite the fact that the haptic exchange, described 
above, serves as the locus of the artwork, no attempt 
is, however, made to explain or interpret its content 
in the video. The technical functioning of Alexitimia 
is demonstrated in great detail, but the practices 
depicted before and after this propose that this is not 
all that there is to know about the robot. Presented 
in its partially assembled or unfinished state, the 
robot is rendered comprehensible to causal thinking 
and reasoning. But in the depiction of the interaction 
between the finished robot and the human, the 
emergence of a knowledge or even a not knowing 
(see Borgdorff 2012), that cannot be subsumed 
under the concept, appears to lie at the heart of the 
practices through which the robot’s “functioning” is 
proposed to unfurl. In the video, we thus encounter 
multiple, yet specific, ways of interacting with 
Alexitimia through touch: 
8:39: A hand is seen gently massaging the blob, 
which secretes liquid. Zoom out: The hand 
belongs to the creator. She is kneeling beside the 
robot 
And different choreographies of touching unfold: a 
slow gentle caress, a surface smear, a mechanical 
folding of layers, an assembling of the skin-like 
material. The robot responds by sweating but also 
with a distinct vocabulary of bodily gestures afforded 
by its elasticity and structural configuration: bending 
in, popping back out immediately or slowly, folding 
inwards, lying in wait of what’s next. The robot’s 
response to the touch engenders the next touch, 
which engenders another response from the robot – 
and so on, it seems. A sense of reciprocity emerges. 
  
Figure 6: Still images from the video: Touching unfolding 
between the artist and the robot. Courtesy of Paula 
Gaetano Adi.  
From the perspective of intentionality, touch might 
be considered the primary gesture through which 
softness becomes active or known. Yet Erin 
Manning has also articulated touch as a movement 
towards the not yet known (Blackman 2009). 
Specific gestures of touch, however, also entail an 
anticipation of a specific sensation and sometimes 
also an intent of use. Thus the repertoire of human 
gestures performed onto the robot can equally be 
considered embodied techniques that are informal 
ways of knowing softness. They each subtly index 
classes of activities that unfold within different 
contexts of human activity. Some are appropriate 
and fit for touching a material, others a machine, 
others still for engaging with a living being. Yet they 
all unfold slowly and exude a certain calmness and 
gentleness.  
2.4 Autonomy 
Given the videos’ thorough dissection and 
demystification of the workings of both robots, it 
might seem curious that the discourse in both videos 
explicitly mention and emphasise “autonomy” – a 
concept that broadly refers to independent, self-
conscious self-determination and not deterministic 
processes. Alexitimia is presented as “an 
autonomous robotic agent” (Gaetano Adi 2006) and 
the Octobot as “the first entirely soft, autonomous 
robot” (Harvard University 2016). Autonomy is of 
course a concept that in general figures prominently 
in robotics discourses. It relates to agency, or, one 
might say, the degree to which a robot is able to 
enact itself. But how and in what sense does 
softness afford autonomy for these two robots? 
In The Robotics Primer, an introductory textbook on 
robotics, a robot is defined as: “an autonomous 
system which exists in the physical world, [that] can 
sense its environment, and can act on it to achieve 
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some goals.” And autonomy is further specified in 
the following manner: “An autonomous robot acts on 
the basis of its own decisions, and is not controlled 
by a human” (Mataric ,́ 2007: 2). By this definition 
(which is of course itself rife with ambiguities) neither 
robot would obviously qualify as being autonomous 
– the Octobot does not have sensors and Alexitimia 
appears to be a simple reactive robot, only capable 
of one behaviour, namely to pump “sweat” when 
bending is detected by the piezo sensors above 
some threshold. 
 
The Octobot is, however, also not conceived as 
autonomous by this broad textbook definition, but 
more narrowly by not being tethered to a pneumatic 
or electrical power source, as soft robots usually are. 
Hence, it is solely by virtue of breaking with the 
contingent assumption of contemporary soft robotics 
research that a soft robot must be tethered in order 
to function, that the researchers claim to have 
attained autonomy in the Octobot (Wehner et al. 
2016). As mentioned already, the video emphasises 
this notion of autonomy-as-disconnection by 
depicting the robot separately from humans and any 
specific and identifiable environment. The manual 
human labour and handling involved in its 
production is also elided and its fabrication 
presented as fully automated – thus figuratively 
fulfilling the future vision to which the research 
project itself aims to contribute. Yet upon further 
inspection, it becomes evident that the humanless 
staging in the video, in fact conceals that the human 
sensorium and cognizing is deeply imbricated in the 
design and presentation of this “autonomous” robot. 
The footage of its manufacture and functioning, for 
instance, is played at ten, twelve and fifteen times 
the actual speeds at which they occur. And the 
colourful materials have been stained with pigments 
in order to better reveal the design and the 
functioning of the robot (Science Magazine 2016). 
Both the robot itself and its documentation have thus 
been adjusted and enhanced to lend themselves 
easily to the human eye and its temporalities and to 
be fully legible. Furthermore, as a research robot the 
Octobot is not intended to be a working robot that 
successfully fulfils some purpose “in the wild”, it is 
only a “proof of concept” (Burrows 2016). 
Paradoxically, its primary function is therefore not to 
operate autonomously on its own but to perform and 
communicate itself as a research finding to a human 
audience. 
 
In stark contrast to the Octobot, Alexitimia enacts a 
version of autonomy that seems only actualisable in 
the close company of a human. Its autonomy is 
equally not predicated on an ability to physically 
influence its environment in order to attain some 
specific goal. Instead it seems to be relational in kind 
and to inhere in the robot’s proposed ability to 
sustain what Don Ihde (1990) refers to as an alterity 
relation, that is, to conjure up a sense of 
independent existence or quasi-otherness (whose 
nature and implications I will return to in the final 
subsection of this paper).  
3. SOFTNESS AS A FORCE OF ROBOTICS 
So what is at stake politically in the two different 
enactments of a soft robot? The analysis unfolded 
so far suggests that central categories of soft 
robotics can in themselves become pliable and 
malleable in practices: Softness and knowledge 
hereof can be constructed in more than one way, 
soft autonomy equally so. But this should not make 
us forget that how things exist, and whose reality is 
considered more accurate is indeed a political 
question. Domination could in fact be considered “a 
matter of holding the capacity to differ under control”, 
as anthropologists Martin Holbraad, Morten Axel 
Pedersen and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro have put 
it (Holbraad et al. 2014). As a first move in 
approaching the politics of these two robots, we 
might therefore start by taking note of the different 
positions of enunciation from which they are 
articulated. The Octobot was published in Nature 
and has been hailed widely as a seminal research 
accomplishment in soft robotics research. Alexitimia 
and other soft robotic artworks, however, are yet to 
be recognised as contributions to the production of 
knowledge about soft robots. 
 
To go further in addressing this question, it is 
insightful to dwell on another way in which specific 
object ontologies enact an ontological politics, 
namely through their reality effects and concomitant 
modulations of other objects and concepts (Mol 
1999). I have already noted how “softness”, 
“knowledge” and “autonomy” are respecified in 
different ways within the two sets of soft robotic 
practices. That is, these concepts are enacted with 
specific meanings that modulate their theoretical 
definitions (which in turn might lead us to reconsider 
these)2. A central contrast herein is that the 
practices that envelop the Octobot tend to 
emphasise a separation between humans and 
robots, while those of Alexitimia embrace the 
similarities and the zone of indiscernibility softness 
can produce. And through this, the two robots enact 
two different ways of distinguishing between a 
human and a robot, and with that two different ways 
of performing human subjectivity, different modes of 
subjectivation, that have purchase on politics and 
ethics. To be more precise, the Octobot research 
was driven by, so it appears, an instrumental desire 
for humans to gain control of soft matter. And this 
matter was to be mastered through practices that 
combined techniques of both modern science and 
cybernetics – measurements, numerical 
representation and abstraction (“Veritas”, tellingly, 
resided in the robot’s its “logic circuit” and not its 
limbs) and systematic technology-aided trial and 
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error. A number of philosophies of technology and 
science have been critical of this set of 
epistemological operations, that have been 
considered “reductive” acts of epistemic violence 
towards situated experience and non-hegemonic 
ways of knowing. But seen from a post-critical 
perspective, the reduction they entail is not 
necessarily simply negative or lamentable.  
Concepts and abstractions, in general, function to 
reduce and manage the multitude of differences we 
encounter in the world. As such, they effectuate a 
reduction of complexity that is necessary for thinking 
and acting to occur. Hence in practice the reduction 
performed via natural science and technology is also 
productive. Furthermore, from a posthumanist 
perspective, Alexitimia’s enactment of softness in a 
robot can equally be considered both reductive and 
productive, albeit in a different manner: It is 
predominantly articulated from the point of view of a 
human body and does not acknowledge the equally 
(possibly) real myriad processes that unfold through 
other modalities than human sensation on different 
scales (the global circuits of latex manufacture and 
their ecological and social effects, the entropic 
grounds of soft polymer elasticity etc.).  
 
In line with this view of reduction as productive, 
Isabelle Stengers (2005b) has argued that instead 
of seeing the successes of experimental science 
and technology as instances of matter’s submission 
to thought, we might also affirmatively view them as 
increases of what has now become possible: “[W]hat 
they [experimental science and technology] address 
becomes able to do what it could not do in the usual 
circumstances” (Stengers 2005b). Consequently, 
what we are witnessing in functioning technology, 
according to Stengers, is not submission but “a force 
which has been both unfolded and re-folded” (ibid.). 
So how is softness produced here, within these 
specific empirical ontologies of the two soft robots, 
how is softness actualised as a force and what does 
it become capable of? 
 
By looking at soft matter and chemistry through 
concepts previously used to describe electronic 
circuits and aided by rapid prototyping technologies, 
it was possible to construct an oscillatory control 
circuit for the Octobot out of soft matter and chemical 
reactions. That is, coupled with these specific 
concepts and their associated practices and this 
equipment, softness can afford a robot untethered 
autonomy and allow for an integration of systems 
and components (actuation, control, computation) 
that are usually separate in a robot.  
 
Alexitimia, on the other hand, evinced that 
assembled with a microcontroller and sensors as an 
interactive artwork, soft matter can equally engender 
what we might term “soft interactions” with humans. 
These exchanges were characterised by specific 
speeds and specific gestures that appear to be tied 
to soft matter in general (as previously described). 
The result was, that in this configuration, coupled 
with this set of practices, the physical softness of the 
material was translated into “soft” movements and 
also aided in manifesting other meanings that the 
word “soft” has as an adjective – “producing 
agreeable … sensations”, being “characterized by 
ease and quiet enjoyment” and being “of a calm or 
placid character” (Oxford English Dictionary).  
 
3.1 Towards an affirmative soft robot ethics 
That multiple meanings of softness were actualised 
in the “soft interactions” of Alexitimia, illustrates the 
need to go beyond the strictly technical definitions of 
softness, used within contemporary soft robotics 
research, when conceptualising the interactions that 
a soft robot might have with organisms or other 
elements in its environment. Furthermore, it points 
to the potential for artworks to help in inventing new 
ways of knowing and experiencing softness and a 
more adequate expanded vocabulary to address it. 
 
Taken as a representation of an epistemic practice, 
the video on Alexitimia aligns with Andrew 
Pickering’s description of how some interactive 
artworks can be considered “implicit invitation[s] ... 
to adopt a non- or post-scientific worldview which 
sees humanity not in a position of cognitive control 
but rather as simply caught up in the weather of 
unpredictable becoming” as he puts it (Pickering, 
2016). In that sense Alexitimia’s versioning of 
softness can be seen to point beyond a purely 
instrumental notion of technology, and towards a 
receptivity to not just the quasi-otherness of a soft 
artificial embodied agent, but also to the otherness 
that resides within the human, i.e. the non-human 
constituents of human subjectivity that elide 
conscious knowledge and control. Given the 
imperative of posthumanist theory to rid ourselves of 
the humanist fantasy of the Cartesian subject as 
autonomous and set above the world (see Braidotti 
2013; Wolfe 2009), this is arguably a both relevant 
and timely experience. The work can, moreover, 
serve as a productive counter to the currently 
existing discourse on soft robot ethics. The only 
academic publication that currently deals with soft 
robots from the point of view of ethics namely 
worries that their soft tactility might have the effect 
of creating more deeply felt emotional attachments 
in interactions with humans. The authors therefore 
recommend soft roboticists who are involved in 
designing soft robots for interaction with humans to 
“balance tactile engagement against emotional 
manipulation” and to “model intimacy on the bonding 
with a tool not with a person” (Arnold and Scheutz 
2017). This recommendation, formulated from a 
stance of morality (what people should do) rather 
than ethics (what people can become capable of), I 
posit, is problematic as it elides the growing body of 
Enacting the Soft Automaton 
Jørgensen 
8 
work within STS and related disciplines that stress 
that advanced technological “tools” are rarely 
uncomplicated and straightforward to “bond with” let 
alone implement in societies. As I have tried to 
articulate through my treatment of the Alexitimia 
video, embracing, rather than repressing, the 
affective potentials of soft robots on the contrary has 
the potential to make us question the conception of 
robots as simple tools that we can expect to yield 
and fully control. Artworks and the onto-epistemic 
practices of art could potentially add this more 
modest way of engaging with and thinking about the 
world, that does not presuppose a fixed power 
relation between humans and world or humans and 
robots, to the current repertoire of methods within 
soft robotics research. If the proposed application of 
soft robots (outside the lab and the white cube) in 
so-called welfare and care technologies stands to 
happen, surely this would be no small feat, as this 
clearly raises other issues than functionality and 
safety, that one needs to attend to in a careful, 
experimental manner. 
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NOTES 
1. Paula Gaetano Adi, email to author, 29 May 2018. 
2. On the concept of respecification see Sormani et 
al. 2017. 
 
